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FOREIGN AUTOMOBILE FIRMS: 
WHY ARE THEY PRODUCING HERE? 
Robert M. Cahill 
I. Introduction 
In 1973, when American automobile pro-
ducers finally recognized the fact that they 
would have to offer small cars to the American 
public, Japanese automakers accounted for 
only 6.3% of the U.S. car market. However, by 
1983 this percentage had climbed to a market 
share of 21% (Forbes, December 5, 1983, 
p. 43). U.S. automobile firms, who were slowly 
getting into the business of making small cars, 
found that when their new compact models 
were introduced they did not outsell their 
foreign counterparts. In 1982, small and com-
pact cars comprised sixty percent of U.S. auto 
sales. The fact that imports accounted for over 
forty percent of this market segment clearly 
illustrates the weakness of the American auto 
industry in this area (DeLorenzo, 1982, p. 31). 
The solutions suggested to this problem of 
the eroding American market share have been 
varied, but most have been based on some form 
of protectionism. The most common proposal 
has been that of import restrictions in the form 
of import quotas and tariffs. More recently, 
domestic content legislation has found con-
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siderable political support. Still a third proposal 
for dealing with the import problem has been 
the notion of requiring foreign auto firms with 
substantial U.S. market shares to set up pro-
duction facilities in the United States. 
In this essay I will investigate this last pro-
posal more closely by examining three foreign 
auto firms already operating in this country and 
one auto firm that soon will be. In doing so, I 
will attempt to discover the specific motives 
that have inspired these firms to make large in-
vestments in U.S. facilities. Essentially, the 
question will be asked, Have these firms located 
in the U.S. for the principal purpose of reaping 
high economic profits, or do they see the politi-
cal returns gained by diffusing the protectionist 
outcry in the U.S. as being the major benefit? I 
believe that an examination of the firms-
Volkswagen of America (New Stanton, PA), 
American Honda Motor Co. (Marysville, OH), 
Nissan Motor Manufacturing U.S.A. (Smyrna, 
TN), and GM-Toyota (Fremont, CA)-along 
with a consideration of the views of the man-
agements of these firms will help to supply the 
answer to this question. 
II. The Age of the Small Car 
Before beginning my investigation of those 
four firms, a brief summary of the events lead-
ing to the present import situation is necessary. 
In October of 1973, political and military dis-
ruptions in the Mideast resulted in an oil em-
bargo which sent gasoline prices spiraling up-
ward. American car owners, who were spoiled 
by the low cost of gasoline in the past, were 
now faced with the hardship of paying more to 
run their large, gas-guzzling cars. The ensuing 
years saw a gradual move by the public towards 
the more efficient foreign cars, but American 
auto makers continued to assure themselves 
that their U.S. customers still preferred the tra-
ditionallarge cars. In 1979, however, when gas 
prices reached the $1.00/gallon mark due to 
another supply shock in the world oil market, 
the shift to small cars became almost manda-
tory for most Americans. They may have pre-
ferred to own the larger cars traditionally of-
fered in the U.S., but it was clear now that their 
pocketbooks would no longer allow them to do 
so. Given the new outlook for gasoline costs, 
American automobile firms gradually realized 
that they would have to offer smaller, fuel-effi-
cient cars if they were going to regain their 
once dominant market share position in the 
domestic car market. 
The belated response of the American auto 
industry came in the ' form of several new com-
pact lines. In addition to the American built of-
ferings of the big three, Chrysler also offered 
various compact models which were made in 
Japan (i.e., Dodge Colt and Plymouth Champ). 
While the sales success of these foreign cars 
sold under American nameplates was not over-
whelming, the reaction to the American made 
compacts was even less encouraging (Automo-
tive News, Oct. 24, 1983, p. 3). Two reasons for 
the lack of success of the American made com-
pacts were their higher price and inferior qual-
ity in comparison to the foreign compacts. The 
fact that foreign small cars were priced below 
their American counterparts can be attributed 
to differences in labor costs and productivity 
between the countries (Abernathy, Clark, Kan-
tron, 1981, p. 68). Perhaps the more critical 
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problem, however, was that the American pub-
lic believed that American-made small cars 
were of inferior quality in comparison to the 
imports. While American auto makers were 
clearly the large-car experts, they were not re-
spected for the quality of their small-car offer-
ings. This poor public image in the compact 
area would prove to be a major obstacle in com-
peting with the Japanese and German pro-
ducers. Therefore, as a result of higher produc-
tion costs and an "image" problem, American 
firms found that they could not be competitive 
in the small car segment of the industry (Auto-
motive News, Oct. 24, 1983, p. 3). When this 
competitive disadvantage combined with a 
severe economic recession in 1980 and 1981 to 
cause thousands of American auto workers to 
lose their jobs, public pressure on American 
politicians led to several protectionist "solu-
tions." 
III. Political Reaction 
With U.S. firms experiencing only limited 
success in attempting to compete directly with 
foreign compact offerings, attention was di-
rected to restrictive trade policies instead. 
Faced with the danger of import quotas for 
1982, the Japanese government voluntarily 
agreed to limit its new car exports to 1,680,000 
units per year until March of 1984 (Thurow, 
1983, p. 19). The Reagan administration has 
recently negotiated a year's extension of volun-
tary restrictions, this time with a ceiling on 
Japanese imports of 1.8 million vehicles for 
1985 (Sundstrom, Oct. 24, 1983, p. 2). Several 
other measures have also been proposed which 
would impose tariffs on Japanese imports to 
make American products more "price-competi-
tive." For example, in a bill sponsored by Sena-
tor Carl Leven of Michigan, imported autos 
would be taxed an amount "equal to the cost 
increases borne by domestic autos when enter-
ing foreign markets" (Sundstrom, Oct. 24, 
1983, p. 2). Leven contends that this law would 
counter the restrictive trade barriers imposed 
against U.S. goods in many foreign markets, 
particularly Japan. 
Another proposal designed to stem the 
growing flood of imports into the American mar-
ketplace has been domestic content legislation. 
This bill, which has strong support from both 
the UAW and AFL-CIO, passed the House on 
December 15, 1983 but was stalled in the Sen-
ate. Sponsored by James Florio, a New Jersey 
Democrat, it would require a major portion of 
automobiles and automobile components sold 
in the United States to be produced by Ameri-
can workers. For auto makers with sales in ex-
cess of 900,000 units, the minimum "domestic 
content ratio" (i.e., the ratio of the value of 
made-in-America components to total produc-
tion costs) would be 30 percent in 1985, 60 
percent in 1986, and 90 percent in 1987 and 
beyond (Corrigan, 1983, p. 1159). Domestic 
content legislation has met with criticism from 
many groups, including the Reagan Administra-
tion, who claim that such legislation would ham-
per world trade and ultimately cost the U.S. 
even more jobs as other nations took retalia-
tory action against such a protectionist move. 
In addition to import quotas, restrictive 
tariffs and domestic content legislation, many 
groups have called for firms having large U.S. 
sales volumes to produce more of their vehicles 
in the U.S. (DeLorenzo, 1981, p. 110). As I 
have mentioned earlier, this invitation has been 
accepted by four firms so far, with three facili-
ties currently in operation. The arrival of these 
firms on American shores is somewhat curious. 
Given that the United States auto industry has 
the highest labor cost of any auto industry in 
the world, it is clear that production costs for 
these firms will be higher in the U.S. than in 
their home countries (Abernathy, Clark, Kan-
tron, 1981, p. 68). Since these higher produc-
tion costs will cut into the profit margins of 
these foreign auto makers, the overall return 
on these investments must contain a large in-
tangible benefit which makes the total return 
on investment attractive. It is the belief of many 
groups that this non-monetary return is the po-
litical benefit derived from employing Ameri-
can workers to produce their own cars. It may 
be safely said that these investments have 
reduced protectionist fervor to some degree, 
and they may also have provided a hedge for a 
future in which mandatory import quotas and 
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local content legislation could become a reality. 
If such developments do occur, these firms will 
then be able to meet some of their demand 
from within the U.S. without being subject to 
restrictions on these vehicles. 
IV. An Analysis of the Four Firms 
I will now take a brief look at each of the 
four firms in question. The focus will be on the 
details of each respective investment decision 
along with a general appraisal of their profita-
bility in the U.S. thus far. 
A. Volkswagen 
In 1978, Volkswagen held 5% of the new 
car market in the United States and its future 
looked very bright. In order to meet growing 
U.S. demand, VW opted to invest $300 million 
in a plant in New Stanton, Pennsylvania. The 
plant, which began production in 1978, was to 
build Rabbits for the U.S. market. Although 
production costs at that time were similar to 
those in Germany, VW officials believed the 
overall costs in the U.S. would be lower than 
the "landed cost" of its imported models when 
freight and handling charges were taken into 
account. In 1983, however, VW's market share 
plummetted to 2.2% of the U.S. market. As 
sales declined and production costs rose, 
Volkswagen's U.S. facility began to lose money 
with no apparent relief in sight. 
Volkswagen has blamed its deteriorating fi-
nancial situation on several factors. First of all, 
it attributes declining sales to stable gas prices, 
which discourage the sale of economy cars. The 
firm has also noticed an "image problem" faced 
by its American made product, with the public 
perceiving VW's Pennsylvania Rabbit to be in-
ferior to the traditional product of German en-
gineering and manufacturing. On the cost side, 
the VW plant has been forced to pay the same 
pay scales as General Motors and Ford in ac-
cordance with an agreement with the United 
Auto Workers in 1978. As a result of these fac-
tors, it has been estimated by some researchers 
that VW is losing $800 on every vehicle it pro-
duces in America (Economist, 1983, p. 72). 
(VW itself figures its losses are closer to $600 
per vehicle.) Since U.S. produced vehicles ac-
count for one-half of VW's U.S. sales, it is clear 
why VW is in financial straights. 
As a result of VW's 1982 losses of $140 
million, production was cut from 650 vehicles 
per day in February of 1982 to a daily level of 
470 units in 1983. Its workforce, which at one 
time numbered 5, 700 workers, has currently 
fallen to about 3,000 workers. According to 
Carl Hahn, Chairman of Volkswagen-AG (the 
parent company of the U.S. subsidiary, Volks-
wagen of America), VW of America may not 
break even in 1984 despite cost cutting mea-
sures and improved small car sales (Plegue, 
1983, p. 8). At the time of this writing, how-
ever, Volkswagen has given no indication that 
it will abandon its U.S. investment; rather it 
plans instead to continue to cut back produc-
tion so as to minimize losses. 
Why would any firm which is experiencing 
losses in one of its divisions continue to 
operate that division even if it was not expected 
to recover in the foreseeable future? VW offi-
cials provide the answer to this question when 
they admit they are keeping the plant open to 
conform to the American political environ-
ment. As one VW executive has commented, 
"Our philosophy was to bend and adapt to the 
American system" (Economist, 1983, p. 72). 
VW officials also point out that domestic con-
tent measures, if passed, would make VW's 
American production facility a great asset. 
Thus, if VW's decision to continue U.S. pro-
duction does not appear to be sound in a purely 
economic sense, the firm clearly feels the po-
tential rewards of the facility .warrant its con-
tinued operation. 
B. Honda 
American Honda Motor Company Incor-
porated has been producing motorcycles in 
Marysville, Ohio since September of 1979. In 
December of 1980, plans for an adjacent auto-
mobile facility were drawn up. The $250 mil-
lion plant was completed in the summer of 
1982, and production commenced in early No-
vember of that year. Honda management has 
given two reasons for its large investment in 
this U.S. plant, which currently builds the 
popular Accord hatchback and four-door mod-
4 
els. In 1980, Honda's Japanese production 
facilities were too congested and caused "prod-
ucts to be exported to the U.S. too slowly" 
(Business Week, 1980, p. 112). Honda's man-
agement has also pointed out that with the 
company running out of space and industrial 
land prices rising so sharply, expansion in 
Japan would be too expensive. 
Honda also has greatly feared the mount-
ing political pressure in the U.S. to limit im-
ports. The company has good reason to be 
sensitive to trade barriers, since it is more de-
pendent on the U.S. car market than is any of 
its comp_etitors in Japan (including Toyota and 
Nissan). Therefore, the desire to stave off the 
criticism of American protectionists played an 
important role in the decision to produce cars 
in Ohio, where labor and production costs were 
known to be higher than in Japan. 
While data on the profitability of Honda's 
first year of production are not yet available, it 
is evident that the company has encountered a 
few problems. In April of 1982, Honda was 
forced to agree to allow the United Auto Work-
ers to organize the new plant (Wall Street Jour-
nal, April 26, 1982, p. 5). The result of this 
development almost certainly will be higher 
labor costs for Honda if a UAW local organizes 
there. The state of Ohio has also reneged on 
its pledge to construct a 4-lane highway by 
the plant, a promise it made when negotia-
tions were held with Honda in 1980 (Darlan, 
1983, p. 35). 
In spite of the fact that production is more 
expensive in the United States, Honda manage-
ment felt in 1980 that if strained U.S.-Japanese 
trade relations were to lead to import restric-
tions, they would have had a competitive ad-
vantage over firms with no production facilities 
in the U.S. At the time of its investment deci-
sion (1980), Honda would indeed have had this 
competitive advantage. However, in the next 
three years, Nissan and Toyota also moved to 
hedge themselves against possible legislation 
that would penalize imports. Thus, although 
Honda was the first Japanese firm to realize 
that a plan for foreign plant development had 
to be made in anticipation of trade sanctions, it 
was not to be the last. 
C. Nissan 
The Nissan plant, located in Smyrna, Ten-
nessee, is the largest automotive facility ever 
built by a foreign manufacturer in the United 
States. The plant is also the corporate head-
quarters of Nissan Motor Manufacturing Cor-
poration, U.S.A. Located about 15 miles south-
east of Nashville, the facility represents an 
investment of over $660 million. The plant, 
which is equipped to produce light duty pick-up 
trucks, began production in June of 1983 with 
2,000 employees and a payroll in excess of $90 
million per year. Nissan has already spent $63 
million to send 400 workers to Japan for train-
ing in production techniques. The company 
also expects eventually to utilize worker in-
volvement circles similar to the quality control 
circles already in use in Japan. 
Nissan's management contends that this 
plant will be profitable due to its superior effi-
ciency. Noting that the Tennessee plant is one 
of the most technologically advanced manufac-
turing facilities in the world, Nissan has great 
faith in this contention. Problems could de-
velop that might stand in the way of its profita-
bility, however. The specific area of concern is 
that of unionized labor. Nissan has made it 
clear from the outset that it was adamantly op-
posed to UAW organization at its Tennessee 
plant. The company has stated that the UAW 
could not offer its "production technicians" 
anything that the firm itself would not provide 
(Wall Street Journal, Feb. 8, 1983, p. 1). Nis-
san feels that excessive demands by the union 
could make it difficult for the plant to achieve 
profitability. 
While Nissan executives are encouraged by 
the optimistic profit projections for their plant, 
they are also quick to point out the fact that the 
current domestic content at the Smyrna plant 
is over 40 percent (Nissan Annual Report, 
1982, p. 13). In other words, 40 percent of the 
components used in the trucks are manufac-
tured in America. This, Nissan management 
feels, could be very beneficial if restrictive trade 
legislation is enacted in the U.S. If such legisla-
tion is passed, the present production machin-
ery used to produce the pick-up trucks could be 
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overhauled to handle passenger cars within a 
short period of time. 1 The firm predicts that 
one shift production could be accelerated to 
10,000 vehicles per month if necessary. Thus, 
while Nissan does not foresee a financial loss 
resulting from its investment, it does see the 
overall benefits far exceeding the operating 
profits. The facility is also seen by Nissan man-
agement as a key production outpost within the 
U.S., one insulated from restrictive import 
regulations should they be enacted. 
D. Toyota 
The most recent newcomer to the Ameri-
can Automobile production scene is Toyota 
Motor Corporation. Toyota's entry into the 
U.S. is unique, however, in that it will be a joint 
venture with General Motors. The two com-
panies have agreed to produce a small front-
wheel drive car that will replace the Chevrolet 
Chevette in the 1985 model year. The new 
model is to be an updated version of the Toyota 
Corolla and will be assembled at GM's formerly 
dormant Fremont, California plant. The Fre-
mont plant was built in 1961 at a cost of $300 
million. After $210 million in renovations, the 
plant was used to build GM's A-body cars until 
it was shut down in March of 1982. Toyota, 
looking for a fast way to stifle the growing pro-
tectionist movement in the U.S., found it desir-
able to enter into an agreement with GM, which 
was attempting to bring a subcompact into the 
American market inexpensively and quickly 
(McElroy, 1983, p. 15). 
The agreement, which is subject to ap-
proval of the Federal Trade Commission, calls 
for Toyota to invest $150 million, with GM add-
ing an additional $20 million plus the Fremont 
facility. An average of 4,075 employees will pro-
duce 200,000 cars per year with over one-half 
of the components for these vehicles coming 
from domestic suppliers. At a press conference 
following the signing of the agreement, GM 
chairman Roger B. Smith (1983) noted that 
1Nissan has recently announced plans to produce its 
popular Sentra model in April of 1985. The firm hopes to 
build 100,000 cars per year and estimates tooling costs to 
be $85 million. Engines, transmissions, and body panels 
will be made in the U.S. by 1987 (Autoweek, 1984). 
"the agreement will buy us time to complete de-
velopment of the new assembly and manufac-
turing techniques we need, so we can build 
such cars ourselves competitively." The move is 
seen by Mr. Smith as an interim step by which 
GM can participate in the small car business, 
attract first time car buyers, and preserve 
American jobs. The fact of the matter, however, 
is that the most technologically resourceful and 
financially healthy U.S. auto firm has con-
cluded that it can't compete in the largest seg-
ment of the American car market (Schnapp, 
1982, p. 5). Industry sources believe GM will 
save $1.5 billion by avoiding development and 
tooling costs for a new subcompact of its own. 
In addition, GM is hoping the Japanese can 
teach them how to produce small cars effi-
ciently in the United States. 
Toyota, which will supply its own Chief 
Executive Officer and President at Fremont, 
has vowed to make the plant profitable by using 
only one-half the employees of a comparable 
American plant. Aside from anticipated profits, 
Toyota management also feels confident of de-
riving several other benefits from the joint ven-
ture. First, Toyota believes it will gain U.S. pro-
duction experience with a minimal investment. 
Second, the firm hopes to establish friendly 
relations with the excellent American automo-
tive-related supply industries. Finally, and most 
importantly, Toyota president Eiji Toyoda 
points out that "the agreement will set an 
example of new industrial cooperation that may 
give a solution to the trade problems that exist 
between the two countries (_1983)." 
Considering the remarks of Toyota's man-
agement in conjunction with the more expen-
sive nature of producing automobiles in the 
U.S. versus Japan, it is clear that the decision 
to build here is both a political one and an eco-
nomic one. Not only may the action help to re-
lieve current political pressures toward protec-
tionism, but it will also give Toyota a U.S. 
production facility in the event of stricter im-
port quotas in the future. The most interesting 
aspect of this joint venture is that it will allow 
Toyota to receive these political benefits at an 
initial investment substantially lower than that 
made by its Japanese and European (VW) 
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counterparts. Even if the experiment is not 
profitable, Toyota will in all likelihood receive 
enormous benefits per dollar of outlay in the 
American political environment. 
V. Conclusion 
In summary, through an examination of 
these four cases of foreign investment in auto-
mobile manufacturing, it is possible to infer the 
reasons underlying the decision of these firms 
to locate in the U.S. Basically, there are two 
plausible explanations. The first is that these 
firms actually perceived the U.S. market to be a 
lucrative one and located here to satisfy auto-
mobile demand more inexpensively than was 
possible abroad. The only firm considered here 
whose location decision appears to be based on 
this reason is Volkswagen. This German firm 
came to the U.S. in 1978 apparently with hopes 
of cutting its costs and improving its profitabil-
ity-a hope that was never realized. It is impor-
tant to note, though, that in spite of substantial 
losses over the last three years, VW is continu-
ing to produce cars in this country. Despite los-
ing money on every vehicle produced here, the 
fact that VW has not abandoned its investment 
gives credence to the belief that the firm is now 
simply keeping the facility as a precaution for a 
time when the trade environment in the U.S. 
becomes more hostile. 
The other three firms with foreign ventures 
in the U.S., namely Honda, Nissan, and Toyota, 
appear to have made the decision to locate in 
the U.S. for a different reason. These firms, un-
like Volkswagen initially, have never seen the 
United States as a very attractive place to build 
automobiles. If short term profits were the only 
consideration for these firms, they would con-
tinue to produce cars in Japan and export them 
to the U.S. (Healy, 1983, p. 3). However, by 
recognizing the fact that adverse political pres-
sure will play a large part in the long run pro-
fitability of their firms in the United States, the 
Japanese automakers have elected to locate fa-
cilities in the U.S. In doing so, each firm will be 
less affected by trade barriers such as import 
quotas and domestic content legislation, should 
such measures be introduced. 
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